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WOMEN’S SPORTS AND THE 
FORGOTTEN GENDER 
ARA WILSON* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Gender is a relatively new contender in the world of sports. Any close 
observer of women’s athletics is aware that there are debates underway over the 
boundaries of eligibility in female divisions of sex-divided sports at state, national, 
and international levels.1 While sex testing has existed for decades at the elite 
levels of sport,2 current measures target a scale past what was established through 
nude parades or buccal smears to discover X chromosomes, with varying ideas 
about which sex-linked traits might serve verification purposes. The debate 
within women’s sports is even broader still, asking whether biological measures 
associated with males and females should even provide the basis for determining 
who can compete in sex-segregated female sports. 
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 1.  See generally Silvia Camporesi, Why Caster Semenya and Dutee Chand deserve to compete (and 
win) at Rio 2016, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 9, 2016, 10:09 AM), http://theconversation.com/why-caster-
semenya-and-dutee-chand-deserve-to-compete-and-win-at-rio-2016-63727 [https://perma.cc/2L2A-
9UX5] (arguing against the regulation of biological measures of hyperandrogenism); Malcolm Gladwell 
& Nicholas Thompson, Caster Semenya and the Logic of Olympic Competition, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/sporting-scene/caster-semenya-and-the-logic-of-olympic-
competition [https://perma.cc/A4YP-N6CV] (discussing an argument for setting an upper limit on 
testosterone levels in female Olympic competition); Juliet Macur, What Qualifies a Woman to Compete 
as a Woman? An Ugly Fight Resumes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/08/04/sports/olympics/gender-dutee-chand-india.html [http://perma.cc/HXK7-LPK5] (providing an 
overview of Olympic sprinter Dutee Chand’s lawsuit against the International Association of Athletics 
Federations); Cyd Zeigler, Dutee Chand’s early 100-meter exit says a lot about Caster Semenya, 
OUTSPORTS (Aug. 14, 2016), https://www.outsports.com/2016/8/14/12475190/caster-semenya-dutee-
chand-intersex-olympics [https://perma.cc/2L46-SVW6] (highlighting Dutee Chand’s Olympic 
performance to argue against testosterone regulation in female Olympic competition). 
 2.  See, e.g., LINDSAY PARKS PIEPER, SEX TESTING: GENDER POLICING IN WOMEN’S SPORTS 
(2016) (explaining the ways that the International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF) and the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) undertook sex testing from the 1920s through the 1990s). See 
also María José Martínez-Patiño et al., The unfinished race: 30 years of gender verification in sport, 388 
LANCET 541, 541–42 (2016), available at http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-
6736(16)30963-1/abstract [https://perma.cc/53PN-SAZN] (providing an overview of changes in Olympic 
gender verification approaches from 1961 to 2016). 
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The main fault line in these women’s sports debates lies between two 
understandings of being female for the purposes of competition: one focused on 
sex and one focused on gender. Those emphasizing criteria based on biology, 
whom Alice Dreger calls the Anatomists,3 would establish eligibility based on 
measurable biological differences associated with sex. Conversely, the latter view 
understands gender as the psychic identity of the individual. The Identifiers,4 as 
Dreger dubs them, propose that eligibility to compete in women’s sports be based 
on an athlete’s gender identity, as determined by either self-identification or legal 
sex status. 
Discussions of qualification for women’s sports are awash in highly technical 
detail, backed by citations to scientific studies of human biology. Anatomists insist 
that sex-linked features confer a biological advantage to men in sports. Therefore, 
fair play requires determining biological boundaries between males and females. 
Even the Identifiers traffic fluently in the science of sex differences, deploying 
biological data to counter the view that there are clear-cut and bimorphic 
distinctions between males and females. A passing familiarity with this biological 
material reveals that differentiating between two distinct categories of male and 
female humans is nowhere near as simple as popular thought would suggest. 
Indeed, heightened public attention to the biology of sex in the sports arena has 
been a boon to feminist and queer scholars, who are invested in deconstructing 
or denaturalizing stark binary notions of maleness and femaleness, which, 
interestingly, means that biological sex is still the fulcrum of these discussions 
about sports. Even with voices arguing that gender self-identification is what 
matters for women’s sports, the subject that predominates these discussions is 
sex—the biological domain. 
Compare the amount of attention devoted to understanding the astounding 
complexity of biological sex characteristics with the amount devoted to gender. 
While non-scientists and sports authorities become versed in the technical science 
of sex differentiation, little time is spent parsing the general category of gender. 
Few commentaries offer definitions of gender—beyond explaining that it is not 
sex. They do not explain gender identity, describe different features of gender, or 
cite research that analyzes gender as a structuring element in sports. From these 
discussions, it would appear that all one needs to know about the category of 
gender comes either from which box a legal or psychiatric authority checked off 
or from what is already known from some undefined crowd-sourced common 
sense. However, the existence of the interdisciplinary field of Gender Studies 
shows there is far more to gender than that. 
Compared to the solicitous care accorded to biological sex, the concepts of 
gender in debates about qualification to compete in female sports are 
unexamined, and at best partial. It is not surprising that greater attention is 
 
 3.  Alice Dreger, The Olympic Struggle Over Sex, ATLANTIC (July 2, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/07/the-olympic-struggle-over-sex/259321/ 
[https://perma.cc/X4RL-JBJC]. 
 4.  Id. 
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afforded to sex than to gender given both the historical view of biological sex as 
a relatively obvious quality that is established by looking at one’s body and given 
that the distinction between sex and gender is relatively recent.5 Still, this 
asymmetry is not merely the result of a lag time before more people understand 
intersex conditions or transgender identity. It is also a symptom of the category 
of women’s sports today. Reflection on the category of gender itself can clarify 
some of the murkier areas of debate about the identity of athletes. This article 
offers an exegesis of the gender rubric towards that end. It differentiates between 
two distinct if related dimensions of gender: gender as a person’s identity—the 
touchstone for Dreger’s Identifiers—and gender as a social-cultural institution. 
While both facets of gender have been discussed in relation to sports, the identity 
axis of individual gender identity has taken center stage in the debates about 
eligibility. The concept of gender as identity has thereby displaced the 
understanding of gender as a historical, social, and cultural force that has 
informed critical commentary about women’s sports since at least the 1960s. 
Considering the distinction between gender as an individual property and gender 
as a social phenomenon has implications for thinking about sex-segregated 
sports. Emphasizing this distinction in the meaning of gender recasts the debate 
between Anatomists and Identifiers over criteria for eligibility for women’s 
sports: it shifts the focus from the gender of individual athletes to gender at the 
social scale. A historical and socio-cultural understanding of “women” provides 
a different, and non-biological, rationale for interpreting the protected domain 
of women’s sports than does an historic focus on individual bodies and identities. 
In turn, the social conception of gender leads to a different understanding of an 
individual athlete’s gender in relation to athletic competition. 
II 
GENDER AS IDENTITY 
In its long history as a grammatical term, the word “gender” has described a 
linguistic category of nouns. While contemporary English does not have 
grammatical gender formally (beyond pronouns), its linguistic ancestors did: 
French, Germanic languages, and Old-English assign nouns a gender. While many 
words taking masculine or female grammatical gender refer to people and objects 
that we might associate with biological sex, grammatical gender extends well 
beyond these sexed associations. Some languages assign all nouns a gender from 
two, three, or more options. Therefore, the grammatical category of gender often 
has little to do with what we consider biological sex—for example, a table, which 
arguably has no sex, is assigned the feminine gender in French and the masculine 
gender in German. According to linguistics, grammatical gender derives from the 
 
 5.  See JOANNE J. MEYEROWITZ, HOW SEX CHANGED: A HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUALITY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 3 (2009); David Haig, The Inexorable Rise of Gender and the Decline of Sex: Social 
Change in Academic Titles, 1945–2001, 33 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 87, 87–96 (2004) (tracing the 
emergence of the non-grammatical use of gender in scholarship). 
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symbolic system of language itself rather than from the non-linguistic world.6 
Grammatical gender thus provides an excellent example of how a discursive 
system creates meanings by establishing distinctions, oppositions, or connections 
that do not derive from the material reality outside of the sign system; this 
linguistic insight influenced much analysis of the social-cultural construction of 
reality.7 As this article explains below, this linguistic category of gender was 
repurposed to describe a fundamental attribute of people themselves. The 
application of gender to people and social patterns relied on a distinction 
between biological, physical sex, and the more immaterial domain of masculinity 
and femininity. This schism between biology and psyche-culture echoes the divide 
between the table and its grammatical gender. 
Gender first migrated from grammar to the now commonplace human-
centered usage in mid-twentieth century university medical clinics.8 Johns 
Hopkins University and the University of California Los Angeles developed a 
specialty in the psycho-medical treatment of people who were considered to 
exhibit “disorders” of sex development: the initial focus on intersexuality (called 
hermaphroditism until the 1950s) expanded to include transsexuality—now 
transgender—and homosexuality.9 Among “normal” people, gonadal sex, 
sexuality, self-perception, and gender expression appeared to line up nicely. Those 
who lined up were the statistical norm—meaning a majority of people, who not 
coincidentally also represented the cultural norm—and were evaluated as proper, 
natural, and true. In those with disorders, these elements did not line up. Their 
chromosomes were not the norm; or their psychological self-concept did not 
match their genotype and phenotype. The lack of linear relation among biological 
characteristics, sexual desire, and self-perception was the disorder. Vocabulary for 
capturing these different elements was limited. The word “sex” was modified as 
sex role, sex identity, and psychological sex in ways that seemed to conflate rather 
than illuminate the different elements that practitioners were seeing made a 
person a woman or a man. Practitioners needed terminology to distinguish these 
components and differentiate a person’s biological sex from their feelings of 
 
 6.  See FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Perry Meisel & Haun 
Saussy eds., Wade Baskin trans., 2011) (1959) (providing the original framing of linguistic systems as 
symbolic systems, or structuralism). 
 7.  See Greville G. Corbett, Sex-based and Non-sex-based Gender Systems (Matthew S. Dryer & 
Martin Haspelmath eds., 2013), WORLD ATLAS OF LANGUAGE STRUCTURES ONLINE, available at 
http://wals.info/chapter/31 [https://perma.cc/RZX8-U6TZ] (providing a survey of grammatical gender 
across languages and identifying cases that do and do not refer to what we consider sex); see also Joan 
Scott, Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis, 91 AM. HIST. REV. 1053, 1053–75 (1986) 
(proposing the study of gender as part of a social system of meanings rather than biological sex). 
 8.  See Haig, supra note 5, at 91; see also JEMIMA REPO, THE BIOPOLITICS OF GENDER 24 (2015) 
(explaining Money’s introduction of the concept of gender as distinct from sex). 
 9.  See JOANNE J. MEYEROWITZ, HOW SEX CHANGED: A HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUALITY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 10 (2009) (providing a history of transsexual medicine); ELIZABETH REIS, BODIES IN 
DOUBT: AN AMERICAN HISTORY OF INTERSEX 115–52 (2009) (explaining how Johns Hopkins 
University established the leading protocol on intersex treatment and how it influenced conceptions of 
gender); SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY 93 (2008) (establishing Johns Hopkins University 
and UCLA as earliest United States sites of transsexual clinics). 
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themselves and their conduct. Sexologist John Money drew on contemporary 
sociological language of status and roles to introduce the phrase “gender role” in 
medical publications.10 Money’s use of gender role was closely followed by the 
concept of gender identity, which was the suggestion of psychoanalyst Robert 
Stoller.11 In the late-1960s, the new concept of gender identity spread among those 
working on disorders of sex in the United States and abroad, but it remained 
largely confined to medical and psychological circles.12 Experts did not work 
alone, but rather worked in dialogue with those we now call intersex or 
transgendered people, who also were active agents in seeking care and who 
shaped the emerging medical, legal, and public discourse about gender.13 
The two sides of the women’s sports eligibility debate ultimately hark back to 
the same source. Not surprisingly, the Anatomists’ determination of female 
identity through sex-based characteristics (for example, chromosomal or 
hormonal markers) derives from biomedical science. Less obvious is the fact that 
the concept of gender identity also emerged from mid-twentieth century 
American science and medicine. The notion that gender is a personal, subjective 
identification emerged from the fields of psychology, endocrinology, and sexology, 
and from practitioners who were versed in the unfolding genetic science. In the 
debates around women’s sports, the intellectual source of the Identifiers’ and the 
Anatomists’ arguments come from the same waters. 
Mid-century United States psychiatry drew on a generalized psychological 
framework of the time, an American Freudianism that posited a psychosexual 
development of the self. Sex—in the more capacious sense that included what we 
now call gender identity—was intertwined with sexuality and was central to 
forging a sense of selfhood in early childhood that endured in the adult. In the 
psychoanalytic view, the very understanding of oneself as a distinct person, who 
is the locus of experience and an actor in the world, was inextricable from sex 
(gender) and sexuality. Such a view included convictions about the healthy, 
proper, and normal development of identity. The normal child forms a gender 
identity that matches her biological sex, behaves accordingly, and matures into a 
heterosexual adult. As an essay in the American Journal of Psychoanalysis stated 
in 1968, “disturbance in the earliest periods of development result in ambiguous 
gender identities that compose the group of transsexuals, transvestites, and 
homosexuals.”14 The understanding of gender and sexual non-conformity to 
norms was understood not merely as statistical deviance but as unhealthy, 
 
 10.  John Money, Hermaphroditism, Gender and Precocity in Hyperadrenocorticism: Psychologic 
Findings, 96 BULL. JOHNS HOPKINS HOSP. 253, 254 (1955). 
 11.  Robert J. Stoller, A Contribution to the Study of Gender Identity, 45 INT’L. J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 
220, 220–26 (1964). 
 12.  See Natalie Shainess, The Formation of Gender Identity, 5 J. SEX RES. 75, 75 (1969) (mentioning 
that this version of gender identity was still considered new in the late 1960s). 
 13.  JOANNE J. MEYEROWITZ, HOW SEX CHANGED: A HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUALITY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 10, 153–57 (2009) (highlighting the role of transgender subjects in influencing trans 
medicine or medical understandings of transsexualism). 
 14.  Harry Gershman, The Evolution of Gender Identity, 28 AM. J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 80, 90 (1968).  
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pathological, and disordered. The conflation of gender identity and sexual 
orientation, or the idea that there was something ambiguous to transgender 
people or gays, appears to us now as a messy product of its time. The harsher 
judgments of psychoanalysts were softened by the biomedical approaches of 
Johns Hopkins, or endocrinologists like Harry Benjamin, who accepted gender 
identity as more or less fixed and therefore not amenable to a psychoanalytic 
cure.15 In any case, the mid-century medley of sex, sexuality, and gender identity 
was consonant with scientific ideas of the normal development of selfhood. The 
therapeutic attention that these clinics offered to transgender or intersex patients 
came with labels such as pathological or psychological disorders. Despite these 
normative judgments, transsexual (and later transgender) advocacy relied on this 
biomedical sense of gender as an individual, psychic identity separate from 
biological sex. 
Although this mid-century psycho-medical version of gender combined 
social, somatic, and psychological elements, the psychological sense of gender as 
psychic identity—what had been called “psychological sex”—came to 
predominate. This over-shadowed a sociological meaning implied in the concept 
of gender role. Medical clinics addressing transsexualism understood gender 
primarily to refer to an individual’s psychic identity—at issue was whether or not 
an individual’s identity matched their physical sex, or how mind matched body. 
The individual focus is captured in the way diagnoses consolidated around the 
term identity. According to historian of transsexuality Joanne Meyerowitz, “the 
use of ‘gender identity,’ as opposed to ‘gender role,’ . . . more clearly differentiated 
the subjective sense of self from the behaviors associated with masculinity and 
femininity.”16 In this view, the gendered self has a private psychological interior. 
The psycho-medical understanding of gender identity solidified an enduring 
focus on the individual as the salient unit, with gender as a property of the 
individual. 
Biomedical understandings of both sex and gender identity manifest in 
current debates about eligibility as a female competitor. Whether sex or gender, 
both orientations focus on the individual. The clinical concept of gender identity 
replaced the more social concept of gender roles, with a focus on individual 
psychic identification. The modes of thought that inform these debates share a 
method that is predicated on measuring individuals. Even averages, means, or 
distribution—like testosterone ranges by sex—are predicated on measurements 
established at the level of the individual. However stark the divide between those 
who call for criterion based on sex versus those who call for criterion based on a 
person’s identification, both perspectives rely on the individual athlete as the 
salient unit of evaluation for participation in women’s sports. Such individualism 
is a legacy of each perspective’s origins in biomedicine and psychology. 
 
 
 15.  See MEYEROWITZ, supra note 13, at 102–03 (discussing Benjamin’s work). 
 16.  Id. at 115. 
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Caster Semenya. Dutee Chand. Before them, Renée Richards, Dora Ratjen. 
The instances that have brought the eligibility issue to public light reduce to this 
question: Is this particular athlete female? For nearly a century, authorities have 
sought an effective criterion to define eligibility for female sports to be applied 
to individuals. The individual focus seems obvious in discussion of athletics, which 
recognizes the embodied achievements of people in competition against others. 
Even in a team sport, the collective is comprised of individual selves. When a 
competitor is disqualified on grounds of sex/gender, it is as an individual, not as a 
national team, as has been the case for doping. One of the trenchant criticisms of 
eligibility processes for female sports is the terrible effects it has on specific 
individuals, notably a number of high achieving athletes,17 who are subject to 
invasive scrutiny. 
Consider the efforts to quantify eligibility for trans women, which hinge on 
the question: Is this particular athlete female? The policies of diverse sports 
bodies are a mishmash.18 On the one hand, the Fédération Internationale de 
Volleyball not only requires a birth certificate to establish gender identity, it also 
notes that “[f]emale players may be required to submit a gender certificate and/or 
medical examination.”19 This policy considers gender to be a statutory 
phenomenon. On the other hand, for other authorities, the gender eligibility 
question can now be: How long has this athlete been female? A number of rules, 
including recent International Olympic Committee (IOC) policies, add a 
temporal requirement to qualification; that is, they add a minimum length of time 
that has elapsed since some marker of transition.20 The IOC 2016 requires trans 
women to have declared a female identity for four years and to have a specified 
testosterone level for one year.21 Others, following IOC’s earlier 2004 protocol, 
require two years of taking hormones and “living in their newly assigned 
gender”22 after what is known as gender-confirming or gender-affirming surgery. 
Under either policy, gender is grounded in somatic changes, yet it is the 
differentiation of gender from sex that has introduced a new temporal element 
to identity. 
At the longest, this time element of gender relates to the biographical life. If 
not clear from the birth certificate, how has this child been known throughout 
her life? Debates over gender verification differ not only in the criteria for 
femaleness, but also in the temporal criteria for determination. The International 
Quidditch Association has no temporal criteria; rather, it relies on self-identity. 
 
 17.  See PIEPER, supra note 2, at 133–37 (providing examples of the harmful impact of gender 
verification testing on high-achieving athletes). 
 18.  See Bethany Alice Jones et al., Sport and Transgender People: A Systematic Review of the 
Literature Relating to Sport Participation and Competitive Sport Policies, 47 SPORTS MED. 701, 707–12 
(2017) (providing an overview of thirty-one sports policies “in relation to their inclusiveness of 
transgender competitors”). 
 19.  Id. at 708. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
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The International Gay and Lesbian Football Association relies on legal status, 
and thus on some marker of before and after.23 The criteria for eligibility in 
women’s sports is currently a muddle. Stepping back from the confusing diversity 
of gender policies in athletics, one thing that becomes clear is their exclusive focus 
on the individual as the locus of gender. Policies to establish sex or gender 
eligibility are predicated on gender being the property of the individual, even if 
not determined by the individual herself. If we can bracket the individual nature 
of athletic competition, we can see the emphasis on the individual as a particular 
kind of logic, which is realized in historical and cultural modes. Physical sports 
center on bodies. Within cultures of modernity, bodies themselves are 
conceptualized in deeply individual terms. Classic Western political thought 
emphasizes “possessive individualism,” which sees an individual person “as 
essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities.”24 Possessive 
individualism applies as well to sex and gender. Regarding this Western thought, 
political theorist Paisley Currah says that “sex is cast as an inalienable property 
of the individual, before and outside of politics and therefore not subject to 
revision.”25 While this inalienability has been used to argue against gender 
reassignment, Currah notes that “much transgender rights advocacy and doctrinal 
legal analysis of the problem . . . depend on asserting that gender identity is 
inalienable, immutable” and the property of the person.26 R.W. Connell also 
outlines this widespread Western ontology: “In common-sense understanding 
gender is a property of individual people.”27 Even when the emphasis shifts from 
biological sex, Connell writes, “gender is still usually seen in terms of socially 
produced individual character.”28 
III 
GENDER AS SOCIAL 
The conception of gender as a person’s identity, predicated on a deeply-set 
interior psychic orientation and property of the individual, is central to 
understanding gender scholarship and advocacy. It informs the emerging 
etiquette that holds that the choice of a third-person pronoun should be based on 
the preference of the person referred to, not the speaker’s interpretation of their 
identity. Liberal traditions seem primed to accept the individual’s self-designation 
as the basis for juridical identity. Moreover, there is a discernible trend to use 
gender identification, rather than identification based on biological markers in a 
 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  CRAWFORD B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: 
HOBBES TO LOCKE 3 (Wynford ed., 2011) (1962). 
 25.  PAISLEY CURRAH, NOT THE UNITED STATES OF SEX 26, available by request at 
http://www.academia.edu/8866993/Not_the_United_States_of_Gender_Regulating_Transgender_Identi
ties [https://perma.cc/YV95-W3QY].  
 26.  Id. 
 27.  R.W. CONNELL, GENDER AND POWER: SOCIETY, THE PERSON AND SEXUAL POLITICS 139 
(1987). 
 28.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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range of legal and policy realms. 
However, the concept of gender is not confined to the understanding of it as 
a psychic property of individuals. The history of gender concepts includes a rubric 
focused on social-cultural dimensions that are collective, not individual. 
Considering gender at a social scale—as so much discussion of women’s sports 
since the 1960s has—provides different entry points into the evaluation of sex-
differentiated sports. 
From the late 1960s, feminists began to adopt the term “gender” from the 
medical and psychological realm. Money’s 1955 formulation of “gender role,” 
which drew on a sociological understanding of gender as roles related to gender 
status, offered an early history of this trend. Money wrote: “[T]he term gender 
role is used to signify all those things that a person says or does to disclose himself 
or herself as having the status of boy or man, girl or woman, respectively.”29 
Money’s article prefigures the performative gender theory of Judith Butler by 
many decades. Queer theory, in particular, has emphasized gender not as an 
expression of an inner self, but as acts—“all those things that a person says or 
does”30—that continually reestablish the sex/gender that was presumed to 
precede them. Since one discloses oneself to another, Money’s use of “gender 
role” implies social interactions; “gender status” means the values, meaning, or 
authority that society attributes to that position. Such a sociological conception 
differs from the emphasis on gender identity, or psychological sex, that replaced 
it. Feminist use of gender expanded on this social level. Rather than seeing gender 
identity as the inherent property of individuals, feminists interpreted people’s 
identification as a normative female or male as the result of socio-cultural forces. 
Feminists returned to the grammatical roots of gender in which social systems 
of language arbitrarily assign a gender to nouns representing objects, like tables. 
Most feminists still retained some sense that sex is a biological feature, although 
they did not leave that idea unquestioned. Gayle Rubin’s 1975 article posited that 
“[g]ender is a socially imposed division of the sexes.”31 Making the case that both 
sex and gender are social constructions, Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna 
argued that “a world of two ‘sexes’ is a result of the socially shared, taken-for-
granted methods which members use to construct reality.”32 Most feminist voices 
presented gender as a broad social-cultural schema that deployed, but did not 
emanate from, sex differences. As a major feminist historian put it, “gender is 
understood to be a way of classifying phenomena, a socially agreed upon system 
of distinctions rather than an objective description of inherent traits” of sex.33 
While sexology had delinked gender from biological sex, feminists went further, 
 
 29.  Money, supra note 10, at 254. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the “Political Economy” of Sex, in TOWARD AN 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 157, 179 (Rayna R. Reiter ed., 1975). 
 32.  SUZANNE J. KESSLER & WENDY MCKENNA, GENDER: AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL 
APPROACH vii (1978). 
 33.  Joan W. Scott, Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis, in GENDER AND THE POLITICS 
OF HISTORY 29 (1988).  
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showing that the qualities seen to emanate from sex, that were an essential part 
of being a woman, were in fact cultural ascriptions and were moreover predicated 
on subordination to the masculine category. An example relevant to sports would 
be a general belief that women—or at least, white women—were naturally more 
frail than men. This belief translated into the exclusion of women from running 
marathons and the establishment of shorter long-distance events for example in 
cross-country races. Subsequently, women’s performances in distance events have 
shown that belief to be the product of ideology rather than of actual biological 
capacities.34 
A strong version of this feminist theory of the construction of gender holds 
that gender is not an elaboration of sex, but to the contrary that sex is itself a 
social construction. Our gender system, that is also heterosexual, and intersects 
with race and other axes of social difference, produces a cultural emphasis on 
binary sex differences and guides the selection of constituent components of sex.35 
Gender constructs sex. In debates about women’s sports, this perspective 
scrutinizes the investment in identifying some biological sex characteristic to 
define eligible femaleness for competition.36 As Judith Butler wrote about a high-
profile case of determining an elite runner’s eligibility to compete as a female, 
“the negotiated agreement . . . is not based on the ‘facts’ of sex, but on a consensus 
achieved among the various parties to the case about how to proceed.”37 She 
continues: “This co-operative venture suggests as well that sex-determination is 
decided by consensus and, conversely, where there is no consensus, there is no 
determination of sex.”38 By asking, “[is] this not a presumption that sex is a social 
negotiation of some kind?”, Butler is arguing that, insofar as sex matters to us, it 
is defined and therefore created out of social processes.39 
In feminist analysis, deciding who counts as a woman is always the result of a 
social process. Particularly for those drawing from critical traditions beyond a 
formal liberal framework, gender is not only inextricably social, but it is also 
intertwined with power. In decades of feminist thought, as well as in discussions 
about sports, the ways in which that power is understood varies. Noting the 
complexity of defining a clear-cut measure of biological sex, critics of sex 
 
 34.  Maureen M. Smith & Alison M. Wrynn, History of Gender and Gender Equality in the Olympics 
and Paralympics, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SPORT, GENDER AND SEXUALITY 57–65 (Jennifer 
Hargreaves and Eric Anderson eds., 2014) (finding that “male hegemony in the sports world continues 
to impact on women’s opportunities as athletes and leaders in the Olympics and Paralympics”). 
 35.  REPO, supra note 8, at 101; see also ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER 
POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 74 (2000). 
 36.  See PIEPER, supra note 2, at 1–10 (showing that cultural notions of gender shape definitions of 
sex in sport); Cheryl Cooky & Shari L. Dworkin, Policing the Boundaries of Sex: A Critical Examination 
of Gender Verification and the Caster Semenya Controversy, 50 J. SEX RES. 103, 103–11 (2013) (examining 
policies of “gender verification” and “sex testing”). 
 37.  Judith Butler, Wise Distinctions, LRB BLOG (Nov. 20, 2009), https://www.lrb.co.uk/ 
blog/2009/11/20/judith-butler/wise-distinctions [https://perma.cc/AH7B-55SS] (discussing the IAAF 
decision concerning an athlete’s eligibility to compete as female). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
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verification for women’s sports argue that the belief that biology is the arbiter of 
femaleness is an ideological tenet that is shaped by, and reproduces, systemic 
gender inequality.40 
The idea of biologically-based binary sex is organized according to an 
understanding of difference that is organized in relation to heterosexual norms 
and is often inflected with racial connotations: These forces motivate attempts to 
“police” gender and sex in sports. These critics have data at the ready. They can 
point to an enduring history in which exceptional female athletes have been 
derided as not truly female. Many of the female athletes whose gender was 
questioned were from the Cold-War-era communist bloc countries or in the 
present, from the Third World. This intersection of gender with non-Western or 
non-First World identity reinforces feminist suspicions that the investment in 
defining appropriate female status reflected prevailing ideologies.41 Analyses of 
discourse excel in showing how binaries form by excluding those who fit, and 
discourses of female athletes are rife with examples of boundary violations by 
lesbians, women of color, or women who are tall or muscular—“the question of 
too.”42 Even if women’s sports is understood as a domain of empowerment, for 
the critics of sex/gender verification, the effort to “police” boundaries of 
femaleness has more to do with legacies of gender hierarchy, reflecting a view of 
females—or femininity—as needing protection.43 Attempts to fix a definition of 
female that rely on an idea of true sex reinforce, rather than erode, gender schema 
that have long punished athletic girls and women. 
The counterpoint to enforcing boundaries is emphasizing inclusivity—an 
ethical and political commitment to not exclude people based on normative 
judgments. Exclusion is particularly unwarranted when the criteria are 
considered arbitrary, which the shifting targets of biological sex-link measures 
seem to be. It is also subject to critique when the principles of exclusion are 
predicated on, or perpetuate, historical modes of oppression. The unattractive 
history of publics denigrating female athletes for not being “real” women, or for 
being “too masculine,” lends itself to this charge. The feminist understanding that 
gender is a social phenomenon characterized by a particular habit of delimiting 
 
 40.  See Jaime Schultz, Caster Semenya and the “Question of Too”: Sex Testing in Elite Women’s 
Sport and the Issue of Advantage, 63 QUEST 228 (2011). See also PIEPER, supra note 2; Katrina Karkazis 
et al., Out of Bounds: A Critique of the New Policies on Hyperandrogenism in Elite Female Athletes, 12 
AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 3 (2012). 
 41.  See PIEPER, supra note 2, at 123. 
 42.  See Schultz, supra note 40, at 237 (“When does progress in one’s athletic performance come too 
quickly and when is that performance too good for a woman? Allegedly, the combination of Semenya’s 
appearance and the improvements in her race times instigated the calls for her tests.”). See also Katrina 
Karkazis et al., supra note 40, at 3. 
 43.  See PIEPER, supra note 2, at 8 (arguing that the International Olympic Committee’s presumption 
of a “need to protect women athletes degraded female athleticism and reaffirmed a belief in male physical 
superiority.”); Cooky & Dworkin, supra note 36, at 108 (“for sport-governing bodies, sex testing is 
necessary because of the underlying belief that all biological males are stronger, bigger, faster, and thus 
superior athletes . . . .”); Karkazis et al., supra note 40, at 6 (“From the beginning, only female athletes 
have been subjected to sex testing because concerns about ‘fraud’ and ‘fairness’ have centered on the 
possibility that males could unfairly outperform females.”). 
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appropriate modes of being female that are not particularly empowering, athletic-
wise, leads many to prefer letting a competitor’s own identification determine 
eligibility—or, as a compromise, their legal status.44 Perhaps paradoxically, then, 
gender as a social force returns to gender as a psychological attribute of the 
individual, and among activist voices it returns gender to its rightful domain as 
the property of the individual.45 
IV 
GENDER AS INSTITUTION 
The rise of transgender advocacy has invigorated the sense of gender as 
identity, such that in many realms, that is its primary meaning. Yet from a social 
and cultural perspective, the centerpiece of feminist analysis, the major locus of 
gender—and arguably sex—lies in social formations rather than individuals, even 
if individuals realize or challenge gender codes in their being. Such thinking can 
feel counter-intuitive. “It is a considerable leap to think of gender as being also a 
property of collectivities, institutions, and historical processes,” the sociologist 
Connell concedes.46 Yet, as feminist analysis insists, “[t]here are gender 
phenomena of major importance which simply cannot be grasped as properties 
of individuals, however much properties of individuals are implicated in them.”47 
Gender in the social sense refers to codes, customs, institutions, collective 
meanings, and dominant values as well as patterns of behavior and interactions. 
Gender might be described as a social institution itself or as embedded in other 
social institutions. Much of gender scholarship emphasizes language—or more 
precisely, discourse—in an echo of gender’s linguistic roots and the structural 
linguistics that inform discourse analysis. Whether it is a social institution, mode 
of discourse, cultural imaginary,48 or governing logic, gender is a supra-individual 
social fact, formed by patterns shaped in the milieus of particular worlds in 
particular historical moments. 
This conception understands gender as part of social, cultural systems based 
on male dominance. Gender does not only refer to a cultural differentiation 
between two categories of people but also to the way power defines their relation 
and to the notion of systemic inequality in relations among men and women, boys 
and girls. Gender is not gender neutral. Recognizing intersectionality also means 
understanding that gender is one axis of social position that combines with other 
axes, such as race, nationality, and class. Because gender is a social construct, 
feminists assert, gendered arrangements can be changed. 
In reality, feminist views of sports have long reflected this institutional, social 
view of gender. Feminist authors have conceptualized gender at three levels: 
individual/categorical, institutional/distributive, and symbolic/ideological/ 
 
 44.  Karkazis et al., supra note 40. 
 45.  See CURRAH, supra note 25.  
 46.  CONNELL, supra note 27, at 139. 
 47.  Id. at 139. 
 48.  See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES (2004).  
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relational, which are largely determined by the particular school of research.49 
The focus of this article is on what these authors call “institutional/distributive” 
understandings of gender, which sometimes relied on the inherited vocabulary of 
sex roles. For example, numerous studies show “how resources such as 
sponsorships, media coverage, participation possibilities and jobs in sport are 
distributed between men and women” and explain that such differences in 
allocation result from, or amount to, structural inequalities of gender.50 
Other strands of scholarship, such as those from a cultural studies vein, 
consider the enduring conflation of masculinity with athleticism, the ambivalent 
relationship of femaleness to sports, and the ways that race combines with these 
naturalized associations. There is a longstanding body of scholarly analyses, 
advocacy reports, and journalism that emphasizes the institutional form of 
gender in shaping the organization of sports as well as the experience of it, 
discussions which do not depend on the individual gender identification of 
athletes.51 Such work reflects a larger effort to challenge what is seen as the 
systemic organization of women’s athletic activity in a subordinate relation to 
men’s athletic activity—on the way that gender schema subordinate the class that 
is demarcated as female to the male class. 
Such a system may work to the detriment of men. For example, the conflation 
of athleticism with masculinity and the valorization of sports as a public good lead 
to prioritizing participation in sports over academic learning. At the elite levels 
of college sports, Division I male athletes who participate in remunerative sports 
often do not receive a genuine college curriculum, which leads to weaker 
qualifications for life following their athletic tenures.52 Understandably, most 
structural evaluations of gender and sports highlight the penalty on women and 
those who do not conform to gender norms, such as gay men. 
The institutional sense of gender has shaped many policies (like Title IX) 
related to sports, yet this systemic social and historical meaning is elided in the 
debates about eligibility for women’s sports. One explanation for this elision, 
particularly from explicit feminist advocacy that is steeped in structural analysis, 
lies with the increasing prominence of transgender concerns in progressive 
gender and sex politics. This entails a commitment to promoting self-
determination of gender identity as a human right. In advocacy around sports, 
such commitment produces emphasis on including transgender athletes, which in 
practice mostly means the inclusion of trans women or women-identified people 
in women’s divisions of sex-differentiated sports.53 
 
 
 49.  Annalies Knoppers & Mary McDonald, Scholarship on Gender and Sport in Sex Roles and 
Beyond, 63 SEX ROLES 311, 312 (2010). 
 50.  Id. at 313. 
 51.  See id; see also Smith & Wrynn, supra note 34, at 57–65. 
 52.  For a proposal to use Title IX compliance to remedy male athletes deprived of a legitimate 
college education, see Sarah E. Gohl, A Lesson in English and Gender: Title IX and the Male Student-
Athlete, 50 DUKE L.J. 1123, 1156–64 (2001). 
 53.  See generally Karkazis et al., supra note 42. 
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The debates about eligibility for women’s sports oppose a criterion of gender 
identification determined by the athlete or legal authorities—the Identifiers—to 
some version of sex, which is a biological marker determined by biomedical tests. 
These stances appear to understand women’s sports differently. For the 
Anatomists, women’s sports should be a protected category of competition 
because male biological traits often lead to athletic advantage. For the Identifiers, 
there does not appear to be simple consensus about why women’s sports should 
remain a distinct division, and indeed, if it should. Some commentators have 
called for removing a sex/gender-based distinction, perhaps to be substituted with 
other criterion akin to weight classes in wrestling or boxing.54 
V 
THE FORGOTTEN GENDER 
What if we viewed the domain of women’s sports through a social, rather than 
individual lens? Those who champion female participation in sports have relied 
on an ethic of inclusion that operates at the individual level of the individual 
athlete, yet which is inextricable from an understanding that girls and women 
have been systemically excluded from robust athletic competition—with, of 
course, variation across times, cultures, societies, and particular sports. It was a 
stroke of tactical genius to apply Title IX to school sports, which is arguably the 
domain where it has had its strongest effects. Title IX is predicated on recognizing 
that girls and young women have been granted fewer athletic resources by 
schools than boys and young men. Such inequity does not depend on the psychic 
identity of athletes but rather on their social status. It is also not reducible to an 
individual level. The history of organized sports and the cultural values attached 
to athleticism has privileged male participation and has compromised females not 
only as individuals but also at a social scale and as a gender. This inequality 
interprets gender in a systemic, structural, or institutional sense. 
Might recognizing the longue durée of unequal athletic opportunities 
afforded males and females recast the understanding of the protected nature of 
women’s sports? An emphasis on social gender is unlikely to resolve questions of 
how to adjudicate participation in the case where an athlete’s gender raises 
questions. Viewing women’s sports as a social-cultural domain operating in a 
landscape shaped by systemic gender hierarchy does change the terms of the 
debate from the given oppositions of gender versus sex or self-identity versus 
biology. This opposition truncates the meaning of gender for sports. Centering 
on gender brings to the fore different interpretations of women’s sports—
notably, the difference between emphasizing gender as a social institution and as 
an individual identity. Taking gender as a social phenomenon recasts debates 
about women’s sports that are predicated on individual identity. 
 
 54.  Cf. Joanna Harper, Athletic Gender, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2017, at 142–43 
(pointing out that “equitable competition” can and does exist between athletes with different capabilities, 
in boxing for example, as long as the “magnitude of the advantage” is not too high).  
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The systemic view would see the distinct carve-out of women’s sports as a 
remedy to the historical legacy of a gender hierarchy in athletics, which much 
evidence suggests is also on-going. Instead of protecting women’s sports via 
female as individual identity, then, the institutional understanding suggests that 
women’s sports can be seen as a protected class on the basis of social, cultural, 
and historical reasons—institutional gender—rather than an individual basis. 
Critics of gender verification charge that protecting the cultural category of 
female by excluding trans women athletes is unjust. What is less examined is the 
relationship of transgender inclusion predicated on self-determination, or gender 
identity, to investments in women’s sports as a remedy for the social history of 
gender inequality in athletics. 
The institutional understanding of gender involves a different temporality 
than does the attribution of individual identity. In adjudicating an individual’s 
eligibility to compete as a female, the disparate policies focus on the individual 
biography; most current policies concentrate on the present and recent past. The 
social, institutional meaning of gender refers to a historical, rather than 
biographical, sense of time. All evidence suggests that in most countries, most 
college-age athletes, born at the end of the twentieth century, grew up under 
social systems that allocated more resources and value to sports associated with 
males to varying degrees.55 Arguably, an unequal context applies to younger 
athletes as well. The experience of gender non-conforming individuals feeling 
unwelcome in sports realms does not belie the broader social character of 
gendered athletics. Moreover, the existence of prominent trans women athletes 
suggests that not all gender non-conforming children assigned to the male sex 
were alienated from high-level competition. 
A compelling criticism of the focus on sex-linked characteristics in defining 
athletic advantage notes the issue of stark variation in economic resources—
Mandy Merck mentions childhood nutrition, access to coaching and equipment, 
training regimes and financial resources.56 The vast resource inequality among 
countries or within them is a reality that is all too often obscured by the 
presumption of a level playing field at international competitions. The Journal of 
the American Medical Association also notes that many factors advantage or 
disadvantage athletes: “economic opportunities, access to facilities, and skilled 
coaching among them.”57 Tellingly, these examples of what we could see as 
inequality are presented as counterpoints to concerns about male advantage in 
women’s sports. That is because the question of advantage of those assigned male 
at birth has been reduced to questions of biological, sex-linked advantages. 
Financial resources, access to facilities, skilled coaching, training regimes—are 
 
 55.  See Knoppers & McDonald, supra note 49, at 314 (finding that “men’s sport enjoys significantly 
more financial clout and sponsorship support than does women’s sport”); see also Smith & Wrynn, supra 
note 34, at 57–65. 
 56.  Mandy Merck, The Question of Caster Semenya, 160 RADICAL PHIL. 2, 6 (2010). 
 57.  Myron Genel, Joe Leigh Simpson & Albert de la Chapelle, The Olympic Games and Athletic 
Sex Assignment, 316 JAMA 1359, 1360 (2016). 
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these not the precise elements that champions of women’s sports have identified 
as factors disadvantaging female athletes? The emphasis on sex/gender as 
individual identity has obscured legacies of the gendered nature of competitive 
sport. Such structures shape and funnel individual experience. 
It is hard to deny the widespread pattern in which those who are assigned 
male tended to be more encouraged into embodied athleticism—more coached, 
more pushed to compete—within an unequal gender system. In the 1970s, no 
woman could have competed in a decathlon. To this day, few girls play Little 
League Baseball: there are no girls’ baseball teams.58 A trans woman who 
competed in the decathlon, who played baseball or football or other male-
predominant sports, formed her athletic self under a gendered sports culture that 
advantaged participants identified as males. Whatever gender identity an 
individual athlete may have, her formative athletic experience took place within 
a social arena structured by gender. If we recognize that male and female sports 
are social fields situated in history, then we need not reduce gender to individual 
athletes’ identities. This article does not address the question of who should be 
eligible to compete in women’s sports or what the criteria should be. The point is 
that discussions of women’s sports, particularly those that are invested in a 
separate women’s division as a form of protected class,59 need not remain 
confined to a dichotomy between gender identity and biological sex. Moreover, 
support for women’s sports does not need to rest on the identity of individuals, 
whether determined biologically or psychologically. Women’s sports can instead 
be grounded on a commitment to redress gender inequalities in athletic 
opportunities. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Judith Butler asks, “why don’t we think instead about standards for 
participation under gender categories that have the aim of being both egalitarian 
and inclusive?”60 Butler would likely share an understanding that the social 
organization of sports has been unfair to women. By egalitarian, Butler 
presumably means the sense of fair play that informs commitments to a separate 
arena for women’s sports. Along with many feminist observers, Butler’s call for 
inclusion challenges exclusions based on a particular and prejudicial delineation 
of what a “true” woman is. 
 
 
 58.  Scott Cacciola, A Woman Among Boys, N.Y. TIMES (August 21, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/21/sports/being-a-girl-gives-mone-davis-an-edge-at-little-league-
world-series.html [http://perma.cc/K9HX-K9C9] (“Only 1,259 girls played high school baseball 
nationwide in 2013, compared with 474,791 boys . . . .”). 
 59.  See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Sex in Sport, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2017, at 112 
(noting that separate the women’s category in sport can be considered a “legal imperative” and a means 
to reduce discrimination by sex under the equal protection doctrine).   
 60.  Butler, supra note 37. 
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Recognizing a distinction between sex and gender challenged a consensus 
that biological sex is the sole criterion for eligibility to participate in sex-
segregated female sports, while the increasingly sophisticated understanding that 
sex does not fall into two discrete, unitary biological categories complicated the 
articulation of sex-based verification of athletes. Debates about eligibility for the 
protected category of women’s sports have contrasted gender identity with 
biological sex. They ask: How do we decide if this athlete is female—at least 
female in the context of competition? The terms of this debate focus on the 
individual, a legacy of biomedical origins of the concept of gender identity, and 
markers of biological sex. Within the controversy about women’s sports, gender 
has come to refer to identity, with progressive advocacy emphasizing values of 
inclusion of those who do not fit conventional definitions of female. The 
underlying terms of this debate have sidelined a social definition of gender 
despite its central role in arguments for a robust endorsement of women’s sports. 
Butler’s reference to both egalitarian and inclusive aims registers the sports 
debates in a way that nods to two domains of gender, without naming them as 
such. Differentiating these two axes expands the perspective on women’s sports. 
The concept of gender is not confined to the understanding of it as a psychic 
property of individuals. For supporters of women’s sports who recoil at biological 
essentialism, resurrecting the systemic version of gender recasts these debates 
about qualification. The well-documented patterns of gender inequality in sport 
offer grounds for justifying women’s sports in social, not biological terms. Such a 
view can incorporate critiques of “policing” appropriate femininity in sport. At 
the same time, an institutional view of gender might ask athletes about their 
experiences regarding athletics over their lifetimes. Were they shaped by the 
gendered inequalities found in sports? This systemic view does not lead to a new 
technique for adjudicating who qualifies to compete as a female in the protected 
arena of women’s sports. These questions are likely to fall more in the realm of 
ethics for competitors who recognize gender inequality and are committed to a 
value of fair play in women’s sports. Where the understanding of the gender 
identity of individuals and the critical sense that systemic gender inequality 
continues to structure sports agree is in the understanding that one is not born, 
but becomes, a female athlete. 
 
